études contemporaines

The EC/EU: a World Security Actor?

edited by Anne Deighton and Gérard Bossuat

Soleb

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L'Union européenne, acteur de la sécurité mondiale

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foreword

This publication and the conference which preceded it owe much to the cooperation of many people and institutions. Our thanks go to Dr Nicole Gnesotto, who, as Director of the Paris-based European Union Institute for Security Studies (http://www.iss-eu.org/), provided us with a congenial and appropriate base in the Institute in which to hold our conference. Dr. Jenny Raflik's efficient and tireless administration ensured that the complicated organisation of this international conference proceeded smoothly and pleasantly. Many of our participants received co-funding from their universities or places of work, for which we offer our thanks. The support structure of the international Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes (http://www.restena.lu/lcd/cere/uk/groupe/glinfouk.html) has ensured that our work can be seen alongside that of the other international research groups in this wider project, whose conferences and publications mark fifty years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

We are both very grateful to the European Commission's Jean Monnet Action; to the French institutions (CICC, centre de recherche sur les Civilisations et Identités culturelles comparées des sociétés européennes et occidentales de l'université de Cergy-Pontoise, UMR Irice de Paris-I, Paris-IV, CNRS) for funding without which this conference would not have been possible.

avant propos

La publication des actes de cette conférence internationale doit beaucoup à la coopération de nombreuses personnes et institutions. Nos remerciements vont au Dr Nicole Gnesotto qui comme directrice de l'Institut de l'Union européenne pour les études stratégiques (http://www.iss-eu.org/) nous a fourni un lieu approprié et sympathique à l'Institut où s'est tenue la conférence. Son organisation doit beaucoup au travail incessant et efficace du Dr Jenny Raflik qui a facilité son déroulement dans des conditions optimales. Beaucoup des participants ont été aidés par leur université ou leur organisation auxquelles nous exprimons nos remerciements. Le soutien du Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes (http://www.restena.lu/lcd/cere/uk/groupe/glinfouk.html) donne à nos travaux l'assurance que cette publication entre dans le plus large projet de colloques et publications qui marquent les 50 ans de la signature des traités de Rome en 1957.

Nous sommes tous deux reconnaissants à la Commission européenne (Action Jean-Monnet) et aux institutions françaises (CICC, centre de recherche sur les Civilisations et Identités culturelles comparées des sociétés européennes et occidentales de l'université de Cergy-Pontoise, UMR Irice de Paris-I, Paris-IV, CNRS) d'avoir financé cette conférence sans lesquelles elle n'aurait pas pu se tenir.

Anne Deighton

L'Europe

et la sécurité

du monde

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introduction

introduction

The narrative of the change in Europe's fortunes over the last century is remarkable. In 1900, the world was eurocentric. It was dominated by the European great powers with their advanced economies and their empires. By 1945, Europe was powerless, crushed by two self-inflicted and bloody wars. Germany and Europe were then both divided by an "iron curtain", creating two antagonistic blocs in one continent: one capitalist, and one dominated by marxist-leninist ideas. It was in this often insecure environment, where fear of Germany remained, but in which the two global superpowers with their ideologies and weaponry also dominated the smaller European countries, that the Treaty of Rome was signed fifty years ago by six continental West European states (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg).

In fact, the Treaty of Rome itself had little to say about foreign policy, or about external relations beyond the scope for new trading arrangements and Association agreements. In the early 1950s, West European efforts to create a common defence and security identity (the European Defence Community) had failed, and Western Europe had only NATO and the Western European Union. There was some interest in foreign policy machinery with the Fouchet Plans of the late 1950s and early 1960s, but these also floundered by 1962.

It was not until the 1970s that a change began, and growing European self-confidence also brought developments in the activities of the European Commission. Pressures for more common external policies and institutions to reflect greater West European activity did accumulate throughout the cold war, but it was not until the period after 1989 when the pace of change accelerated dramatically and visibly.[1] Some scholars may seek unifying themes in or narratives of Community/ Union foreign policy, such as freedom, peace, prosperity, even federalism, to make the past—and perhaps the present—clearer. However, it is not possible to impose one narrative upon these developments. The past was more complicated, more incremental, more uncertain than any one label can capture. The pressures for change came sometimes from within the Brussels machine, sometimes from member states acting together, sometimes from individual states, or even from individuals. The lack of common clear aims and ambitions for the European Community project—or even of what has been called a finalité for Europe has dogged Europe's politics and some of its scholarship.

The contributions of the scholars who have contributed to this volume reveal those broad elements of the Community/Union's foreign policy that have changed since 1957. They can be briefly summarised as follows:

— **There is now more** foreign policy emanating from Brussels. The EU is more active in the international sphere than it was fifty years ago, and the last fifteen years have seen the greatest development. This is not to say that member states do "less" foreign policy, (whether this is so is not known, but it is unlikely). However, the Brussels machinery—both in the Council and in the Commission—is more extensive and visible. The High Representative, sectoral Council ministers, and the Commissioner for External Relations all have more extensive responsibilities, and the supporting Commissioners with international roles—for enlargement, trade, justice related issues, humanitarian policies, aid and development have serious and significant portfolios.

— **The scope of European Union foreign policy** is more clearly understood. The European Security Strategy has laid out a broad trajectory for the Union for the next few years. There is revived interest in, variously, the role-model; neo-imperial; and normative-based potential of the European Union as a regional and global actor. Yet, somewhat ironically, the limitations upon Union action are also better known. Many of the policy and institutional problems regarding external action have not been resolved (and the collapse of the Constitutional project has been acknowledged to have made further change more difficult).

— **The position of the Union** in relation to the great global power blocs has changed. During the Cold War, the European Community did not take a major independent role in global politics. The tools it had at its disposal were fewer, its membership was smaller, while certain member states conducted autonomous and very vigorous national policies and also opposed a greater EC presence on the international scene. There is consensus that the Union should now be counted amongst the major centres of international economic and political power. While the United States is generally still seen as the pre-eminent global power, analysts also look at the European Union as well as China, Brazil, India, and also Russia as having significant actual or potential sources of power.

— **The relationship** between the EU and other regional and international organisations has also changed. The Council of Europe and the CSCE (now OSCE) have also become more specialized, more dependent upon EU funding, and perhaps more marginal, in relation to the European Union. NATO, while still an important part of the defence profile of most EU states, is widely perceived to count for less now as the primary source of security for its members. The close relationship between the UN and the EU is supported, but the nature and significance of that link is not entirely clear.

— **Resistance to the use of military force** by the member states of the Union acting in the name of the European Union has gradually been eroded. During the cold war, Western European Union and NATO were two sources

of institutional hard power beyond the state, although Western European Union was militarily impotent, and in reality served as a forum for political debate. The principal tensions that exist are now largely between the temptation—but costs—of nationalising military power back to the state level, and the increased sharing of military capabilities with the Union, although the "future of NATO" debate remains a significant one.

— **Commission and Council** have both enjoyed greater roles in policy-making and implementation. Flanking security developments that relate to the use of tools both within Pillars One and Two have increased exponentially: these include measures relating to policing, migration, as well as cross-border legal, trade, administrative, and criminal matters. Such issues were barely detectable on the radar of Community politics in the 1970s.

— **Commission funding for aid** and similar projects has increased. The Union has taken more pride and given greater public attention and funding to its humanitarian, aid and development policies. Member states' contributions also make a very significant contribution.

— **Enlargement.** The long-term commitment to enlargement has had huge and positive effects upon both existing member states and member states who have joined since 1973, and whose foreign policies have then been "Europeanised" by the Community/Union. This is as true for the big European powers, like the United Kingdom and Spain, as well as for the much smaller powers. The very process of enlargement has also obliged the Community/Union to think more carefully about what it is trying to achieve internationally. However, the sheer size and complexity of the Union itself may, without proper management, reach a point when there may be diminishing returns (relating both to Union consensus on specific policies, but also relating to efficiency and capacity) for the enlarged Union in the international sphere.

There are, within this check-list of change, two trends that at first sight appear incompatible, but which policy-makers and contemporary historians alike have had to realize, accept and operationalise. The first relates to the changing nature of foreign, and particularly security policy, and is connected both to the end of the dominant paradigm of the cold war and to forces of globalisation. These developments have resulted in a serious overstretching of the concept of "security" policy. Its meaning has been exponentially widened so that the word is almost meaningless. "Human security policy" is virtually all-inclusive and indistinguishable from "policy"—economics, personal freedom and dignity, individual rights, and environmental issues, as well as traditional military security all seem now to fall under this heading. Alongside this, it is now impossible to understand foreign or security policy as being separate (conceptually or in policy-making terms) from domestic policy. This is true for states, and the EU. Thus immigration, management of security issues like trafficking, drugs, terrorism, environmental and energy security questions cannot effectively be dealt with at the national level alone. Europe is highly interdependent between its own states, as well as with the outside world, and the new security and foreign policy reflects this truth.

However, the second observation is that states remain extremely powerful, both formally and informally, in the European Union, and here lies the great and enduring ambiguity of the Union. States can and do still disagree on major issues that touch philosophical questions: for example, the right of states to intervene militarily across national boundaries; how to react diplomatically to the use of the death penalty by third powers. They also disagree on policies affecting core national interests including the sharing of intelligence; nuclear weaponry; "special" relations with third powers; relations with ex-colonial (colonial overhang remains a potent dimension of national political cultures in many European states) or other hegemonic powers (such as Russia, for some ex-Warsaw Pact countries); as well as the sources of political accountability in foreign affairs (national or European Parliament).

This contradiction between these two truisms is the principal reason why European foreign policy has always been contested, has often been ambiguous, and will not in the short to medium term, ever be as decisive as that of a well-focused state. The fungibility between foreign and domestic policies may have the effect of creating more common ground and perhaps even solidarity between member states, even as policies affecting "abroad" are being discussed, sometimes disputed, but then formulated, and implemented. However, states will not willingly and knowingly give up completely their role in the EU system—and rightly so. This is why nearly every one of the chapters that follow deal with the state-level politics, as well as those of the Union, and this is true even in policy areas that are legally transferred under Treaty law.

Methods

The chapters that follow represent a conscious effort to bring together an international group of historians and international relations scholars, as well as political scientists, and security, economic, legal, environmental and strategic studies experts. All have worked in an historical context as far as has been possible, and have therefore sought to honour the aim of this volume to examine Community/ Union foreign policy over the fifty years since the Treaty of Rome. The editors also sought to achieve a genuinely international balance of scholars, as well as a balance between younger and more experienced scholars: the synergy at our conference was very dynamic.

Methodologically, the book reveals that difficult questions remain for international and transnational scholars of the Union—and that these questions will get more complicated as the Union grows. It is not easy to write both about state and the Union, as they are at different levels of analysis. The easy approach is national, both because archives seem to be more accessible, and also

because decision-making within the Union often seems fuzzy. But a national approach cannot necessarily capture the complexity and themes of a large international institution's policies. Yet, taking a Community/ Union level analysis, it is not easy to know from where policy emerges, as Commission and Council both have strong, if often informal ties with states, or state bureaucracies as well as their own decision-making procedures. The gestation period of some policies adds more complications. Further, it is becoming increasingly clear that scholars of Community/ foreign relations, both current and in the past, need also to examine the recipients of Community/Union policies, the perceptions of those outside the Community/Union and their interaction with Europe. The task of collecting such material, over time and over space, is enormous, and quite obviously requires the application of multilingual teams of scholars, as well as the individual efforts of lone scholars. Only in this way can the different aspects of the histories of Community/ Union foreign policies in time be covered comprehensively.

Outline

The book begins with an examination of the role of the EC/EU in relation to the great powers over time. (Varsori, Rey) These two broad-brush chapters with their wide range of insights are complemented by an original inclusion—a chapter on the rising power of China in relation to the EU policies. (Wong)

The second section examines the institutions and structures of EU policy-making. The issue of representation was always, and remains a sensitive one for the EU. Even today, the member states of the Union continue to have some of their most prestigious embassies in the capital cities of other member-states, even as these same states will have common representation through joint Commission missions (often also with very powerful national links) in third countries outside the Union. (Winand, Dimier) This

speaks volumes about both the structuring of EU foreign policy, the varied nature of what ambassadorial representation is actually about, and of course the economic, investment and trade competition between EU states that is part of the very fabric of the EU itself. The section continues with an examination of the broader pattern of the diplomatic and political development of the Community itself, the setting of the political activities of the major state actors, and the rise and impact of the CSCE process perceived through multinational lenses. (Moeckli, Romano)

While traditional foreign policy—whether civilian diplomacy or the threat of countervailing power—remains at the heart of foreign policy analyses, it is those new areas of external diplomacy that must also attract our attention and our scholarly examination. Development and aid policies (Dearden); and then the gradual weaving of law and justiciable matters into the fabric of EU foreign policy (Mitsilegas) are both examined in Section three: these are rarely considered alongside the more political dimensions of the Community's international role. Yet aid and development have become the two touchstones of those who construct the cultural fabric of the Union as a "normative power". Justice and governance questions and the cultural differences about perceptions of security and non-security issues also remain close to the political agenda across Europe—and never more so than in countries, like Turkey, who wish to join the EU in the future. (Cebeci) Environmental policies are another clear arena for collective, Union-wide foreign policies, as environmental issues are not naturally confined to state borders, whether they concern water, soil, chemicals or the ways in which we exploit and use our resources, and the resultant impact this has upon global warming, levels of "greenhouse gases", our carbon footprints, or radiation. (Izci) The Chernoboyl nuclear disaster was a classic case in point, as restrictions as a result of the fall out from the explosion had to be imposed upon farmers as far away as those who kept sheep on the Welsh hills.

Even as these new foreign policies questions have come to the fore, the old security issues have of course not completely gone away, although they now often appear in a different guise, as the fourth section reveals. During the early cold war, fear about the capacity of West Germany—the old foe—to use force was still extraordinarily raw, and this was with some good reason given the losses of World War II. Yet this perspective upon the European great power equation has subtly changed over time. Issues about the use of force present different challenges over time as the papers in this section show. (Risso) The old questions of territorial integrity and defence have dramatically receded—although the NATO guarantees were of great importance to those countries who were making a bid for double membership of NATO and the EU in the 1990s, all of which gave great leverage to the EU and NATO on security issues as the complex enlargement negotiations progressed through the 1990s and early years of the 21st century. (du Réau)

Today, voluntary interventions to restore order and security in non-EU states have acquired a huge significance, resulting in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy with its accompanying administrative and management structures and consequent debates on the exercise of this power in a multilateral world of which the EU is a part. (Biscop, Tardy) Indeed, one might even glimpse a hint of neo-colonial activity in the multilateral governance and government reconstruction schemes as are under way in the Balkans. Yet, at the same time, traditional mechanisms for power projection—in particular navies—also require reconfiguration at the European level to meet specific, sometimes low-level, but often dangerous types of security challenge that a globalising world has generated. (Germond)

The last section provides archivally-based accounts of three different types of crisis with which West Europeans have had to deal during the cold war. Two economic chapters, with their different levels of analysis—Commission, and nation-state levels—reveal the complexity of international

economic diplomacy within Western Europe. They show the constraints and pressures upon those seeking to invent new economic mechanisms within the European framework, whether over the free trade area, or European Monetary politics. (Warlouzet, Grigowsky). The tensions generated by state initiatives in an environment of European political cooperation is likewise highlighted by analysis of the Falklands war. (Saunier)

Conclusion

The powerlessness of Europe in 1945 has largely disappeared; but the pre-First World War culture of eurocentricity still carries echoes into the 21st century. The path back to Europe's recovery and repositioning in the international system over the past fifty years has been uncertain and sometimes hesitant, as this volume shows. The Union has adapted to many changing priorities thus far, but, like any large international organisation, is slow, often contradictory and cumbersome, and frequently at the mercy of its strongest member-states. And, most important, there is still considerable uncertainty about how Europeans see the culture, nature of the EU, and its role EU in the world.

One crucial question is to know which are the ways in which the EU can and should exercise its international role in a way that captures the consent and as well as the global imagination of its citizens. Most people would say that Europe is now largely territorially secure. Yet if we take the wider definition of security—embracing human and personal security, to many EU citizens the margins between security and insecurity seem very narrow. As the EU takes on the challenge of risk assessment for these new security areas—environment, energy, terror, immigration, drug running—expectations are high that it should both deliver this security within the Union itself, yet also deliver security—especially the basic security

requirement such as life, water, food, and even order—beyond its borders. Why the Union should fulfil this latter imperative, and how it should do it is the stuff of politicians' and policy-makers' discourse and decision both at the national and the Union level.

By the same token, bipolarity has vanished, but do we envisage the rise of a new multipolarity (or even a new bipolarity) between great states and great international organisations like the EU, and the UN? What and where is the competition to the Union, and who are its natural allies? Does the Union itself have the cohesion to act consistently as a global strategic actor? Can such multipolarity actually be constructed and effected without the disasters that accompanied the rise of new powers at the beginning of the Twentieth Century? These are the principal questions which historians, politicians, and hopefully, the global statespeople of the twenty-first century now have to grasp.

1 There is still a notional distinction made between the different aspects of the Community/ Union's presence in the world. External relations was intended to cover the work of the European Commission, carried through under the legal framework of the Treaty of Rome, and concentrating largely upon trade, and aid. Foreign policy is conducted through the so-called Second, intergovernmental Pillar in which the member states play the dominant role, and with mechanisms created under what was called European Political Cooperation, now called the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is out of this Second Pillar that the European Security and Defence Policy has been developed. However, in practise the divisions are far less clear, especially in areas in which the remit of the Pillars overlaps, Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer (eds), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy*, (Zurich: ETH, 2006, www.css.ethz.ch/publications). I am very grateful to Tobias Lenz for comments on this introduction.

EC and the Great Powers

The EC/EU and the US (1957-2006)

Antonio Varsori

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When we deal with the European Community/European Union, we deal with an actor whose main competences today still largely deal with the economic dimension of external action. European Political Cooperation was only created in the early 1970s and was a very weak intergovernmental instrument. It was only with the Maastricht Treaty that the EU fully institutionalised what we now know as the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is therefore inevitable that the following analysis, which covers political and strategic issues as well as economic ones, will have to include the foreign policies of the EC/EU member states, especially the leading states. Nevertheless, the topic remains a vast one. Indeed, if a student of mine wanted to write a dissertation on this topic I would be tempted to suggest jokingly, that he or she might as well try to cover the history of mankind from the creation till today. So this contribution will not be an exhaustive and detailed analysis based on first hand archival sources.[1] Rather, it offers a broad and sometimes impressionistic portrait of half a century of transatlantic relations, and sketches out some tentative interpretations.

The US and the origins of the integration process.

In spite of the fact that I have been asked to start my analysis with the creation of the EEC, it is impossible to forget that the integration process was mainly an American initiative that started with the Marshall Plan and such a policy was further confirmed by the US strong support of both the Schuman Plan and Pleven Plans. It indicates that the US supported not only economic, but also political and military integration, too.[2] In furthering European integration the US based its policy on clear-cut and coherent aims that suited Washington's own interests. For European integration would help to create a powerful Western European bulwark that could face up to the Soviet Union, so helping the US in their confrontation with the Communist world.[3] It would encourage the

creation of an integrated western economic system[4] based on the principle of free trade, so avoiding the dangers of protectionism and autarchy, which in the opinion of US leaders, had favoured the setting up of authoritarian and aggressive regimes during the 1930s, and in the post-war years could create obstacles to America's booming industrial and financial system. It would favour the spreading of a political, economic and social model, which was similar to the American one, so creating a western system whose ties were not merely the outcome of military might, political alliances and economic agreements, but rather the outcome of common political project.[5] Such a policy was not only the result of a clear-cut strategy that aimed at creating a new form of "empire". The support the US authorities gave to the integration process between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s was also the result of a cultural sensitivity about the need to strengthen or in some case to create a western system which was based on common values, or even common feelings. Such a project pointed out the relevance of Europe in the minds of most US leaders. The US had been created by Europeans as a reaction to Europe's faults, but US elites could not forget that the ideological basis of the American nation had their roots in Europe's cultural and religious experience.[6]

The US had chosen an isolationist—and sometimes hostile—attitude towards Europe when the European nations had been too powerful, imperialistic and strongly influenced by the "evils" which the European immigrants to the US had rejected; but in the post-war period Europe appeared weak and threatened by communism and it was now to the American "son" to rescue the European "father" who was confronted with a deadly danger. In spite of the interpretations about the end of Europe's central role in the international system, as well as of two emerging superpowers, it would be possible to say that in the immediate postwar period, Europe was the focus of both US and Soviet interests because the control of Europe was the main issue at stake in the early cold war years.[7]

Obviously it would be a mistake to argue that the US were the only actors in the integration process, for the ideal of European union was the outcome of initiatives pursued by some European elites too. I would here stress that they were elites and we may doubt whether they represented a majority in their own countries. Most European supporters of the integration process shared US aims and in some case they appeared to develop a common vision and to adhere to the common ideal of a western system based on two pillars, on one hand the US—or better North America—, on the other hand a united Western Europe. Some interesting and thoughtful essays have been written in the past on the role played by both European leaders such as Jean Monnet and his American "friends".[8] On both sides of the Atlantic there were strong bonds that linked the US and Western Europe: anti-communism and the need to save the western civilisation. In the Europeanist leaders' opinion, however, the integration process also meant something-else: the aspiration at rebuilding Europe's central role in the international system, at saving Europe's best traditions from an almost barbarian un-European threat—that is Communist Russia—and to solve a traditional European problem—an instrument and a goal at the same time—that is the German question, which, in the opinion of most Europeanists, had concurred in fuelling both the First and Second World Wars. Both conflicts were perceived as European wars, that had become global ones, as well as two attempted suicides on the part of Europe[9]. Those European aims, however, could be and were usually shared by the US leadership. On the other hand on both sides of the Atlantic the supporters of the integration process shared a common experience: the war, sometimes two wars, fought on the same side, a further psychological bond that we cannot underrate in our attempt at explaining the relationship between the US and Western European élites.[10]

There were, however, some serious obstacles to the development of a stronger link between the US and a united western Europe. In an early stage those obstacles were more powerful in Europe than in the US, as they were represented by political options that had a strong appeal and a powerful

moral force. Communist parties-strong and influential in France and Italy-interpreted the integration process as the instrument of US imperialism.[11] But it is impossible to forget that European integration was rejected by right-wing and conservative forces too, as they feared that European integration could mean the end of the traditional nation state. Moreover different kinds of anti-Americanism were widespread in western Europe, and anti-Americanism was not only the outcome of postwar Soviet propaganda, as it had some deep roots in Europe's cultural tradition.[12] Last but not least anti-Americanism was very often fuelled by high-handed American attitudes, by US missionary zeal, and by the patronizing attitude of some US politicians. (Dulles "agonizing reappraisal" statement is the most obvious example).[13]

In the mid-1950s, also as a consequence of US frustrations in the face of western European doubts about the EDC and the ECP, there was an early weakening of US commitment to the integration process. On the other hand the Eisenhower administration began to feel that the cold war would and had to be fought, not only in the European continent, but also in other geographic areas; so the US began to focus their attention on the third world as they realised that decolonization was going to change the world system.[14] Last but not least, as far as Europe was concerned, the Paris agreements gave the US a precious opportunity, as the collapse of the EDC and the strengthening of NATO offered Washington, not only an effective means of confronting the Soviet Union in Europe, but also the instrument through which they could develop a long-term influence—perhaps we may say hegemony—over western Europe. So as a consequence of France's and Britain's aspirations to maintain their world and colonial roles, western Europe concurred in creating what has been labelled as an "Empire by invitation".[15]

In US leaders' opinion European integration, however, was still a useful goal, although we may wonder whether by now it was the main goal, or just one goal in a wider set of foreign policy priorities. So it is not surprising that

the US, although with a lower profile, supported the "relaunching of Europe": a united western Europe was still regarded as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and the creation of a European Economic Community could strengthen the western economic system. During the negotiations for the creation of the EEC, the Common Agricultural Policy was still a vague goal and, although the EEC treaty forecast a common external tariff, the presence of US investments in Western Europe was so strong to defend American economic interests: a richer western Europe could be an asset for both US political and economic interests.[16] Moreover in its early stage EURATOM would be based on a close cooperation with the US in the field of technology.[17] Last but not least the promoters of the "relaunching of Europe" were the same moderate anti-Communist leaders who appeared to share common values with their US partners.[18]

On the other hand, although the promoters of the EEC and the EURATOM perceived those two bodies as a way to favour European integration through a functionalist approach and the achievement of European interests, they believed that those aims were not in contrast with close ties between western Europe and the US; on the contrary they still believed in the creation of a second European pillar, a relevant part of a wider western system, although for the time being such a pillar would be developed very cautiously and only in the economic dimension.[19]

An "American" European Community vs. a gaullist Europe?

When we deal with the relations between the EEC and the US between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, this period appears to be mainly characterised by the gaullist project for a more independent Western Europe, and by the contrast between the US and gaullist France. Moreover early trade wars between the EEC and the US (the first "chicken war" took place in 1960) seem to point

out the creation, through the EEC, of a regional economic actor that was going to compete fiercely with the US, which, on the contrary, still supported the concept of a global economic system.[20]

However, these early distinctions between the EEC and the US have been overrated. As a preliminary remark, some recent studies seem to reassess de Gaulle's anti-Americanism, both in its meaning and in its effectiveness. We cannot forget some episodes such as the contrast over the development of a French independent nuclear deterrent or de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's application to the Common Market, but at least till 1964, de Gaulle shared some US foreign policy aims as far as the cold war was concerned. Between 1958 and 1960 de Gaulle would have accepted the US in a restructured NATO as a close ally of France as a close ally in the early 1960s, in spite of some French suspicions about US intentions, for the French authorities shared Washington's fears of Soviet growing influence in Africa; and France's leaving the military command structure of NATO did not mean the end of France's commitment to the Atlantic Pact, while France still relied on some NATO's facilities.[21]

During that same period, the leaders of the "five" usually regarded Washington as their main point of reference and, although with some minor differences of opinion and with a few exceptions, western Europe's leading politicians, from Erhard to Kiesinger, from Fanfani to Moro, from Spaak to Harmel, from Luns to Mansholt, usually nurtured staunchly pro-American positions.[22] Even Adenauer was eager to develop a close French-German alliance, though this owed more to a decreasing confidence in the Kennedy administration's will to defend Germany than his hostility towards the US.[23] Moreover some leading Europeanists, such as Monnet, were still active, and Monnet's close relationship with Eisenhower and Kennedy has been already stressed in some well-known studies.[24] If on one hand the "five" very often looked for a compromise with de Gaulle,

on several issues, such as the characters of a European union or United Kingdom's application they were very near to the policies pursued by various US administrations.[25] Moreover the psychological attitudes and policies of most EEC leaders were still characterised by a staunch anti-Communist approach; western values, largely shared on both shores of the Atlantic, were still paramount in the political discourse of western Europe's ruling elites. Last but not least American popular culture played a relevant role in shaping the attitude of western European public opinions, with the obvious exceptions of the Communist parties and some right wing groups.[26] Also from the political viewpoint, at least till the early 1960s, the United States appeared as a model. In this connection it would be possible to point out the Kennedy myth which survived long after the President's death, as well as US technological and scientific achievements.[27]

As far as the United States were concerned, we may wonder whether they were much concerned about the economic consequences of the creation of the EEC: obviously they could not embrace the CAP or other protectionist aspects of the Common Market, and some recent studies have pointed out the contrasts which surfaced between the EEC and the US in the context of the Kennedy Round negotiations. In spite of those difficulties, US multinationals adapted themselves to the EEC, as a wealthier Western Europe was regarded as an interesting market for American goods,[28] and in the GATT negotiations the US and the EEC were usually able to find out some compromise.[29] From the political viewpoint the integration process was still perceived in Washington as a positive development for US interests, as it would strengthen the Western position with regard to the Soviet Union. It offered, with the help of NATO, a solution to the German problem and was evidence of the positive influence exerted by western values and ideals. Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson appeared to be steady supporters of the integration process, as it has been demonstrated by numerous studies.[30] On the other

hand the US were aware of the fact that they could rely on NATO as an instrument to impose their influence on western Europe: in 1962 the western allies complied with the new US strategy based on the "flexible response" and, in spite of de Gaulle's decision to leave NATO and the failure of the project for the creation of a Multi-Lateral Force, in the late 1960s the Atlantic Alliance survived as a powerful pillar in US "European" policy.[31]

Nevertheless, between the late 1950s and the late 1960s Washington's interpretation of the international system experienced some change: US foreign policy was more and more global and American authorities focussed their attention on the confrontation with the Soviet Union, which now took place in once remote areas such as Congo, the Middle East, Viet Nam, Laos, Latin America; and in new contexts such as the race for the moon or the economic aid to Third World countries.[32] Europe seemed to be a stabilized area and from the building of the Berlin Wall onwards it was no longer the main arena of the Cold War confrontation.

In spite of that, and the extended bipolar system, western Europe was perceived in numerous American milieux as a partner, although a junior one, while the Thirld World was just a chessboard where the US and the USSR were developing a new form of cold war. Last but not least, Europe and the ties with Europe still meant something in the minds of large sectors of American citizens, at least from the "cultural"—both popular and elite-viewpoint: an increasing number of US tourists visited Europe, in numerous US movies from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s Paris was not de Gaulle, but the most fascinating European capital—perhaps with Rome; the Fulbright program favoured the flow of thousand European young scholars to US universities.[33] Till the mid-1960s America's Europe was very strong, Gaullist Europe, if it existed at all, was very weak. As far as the EEC was concerned, the Community was mainly perceived as an aspect of such an American Europe and just a minor economic nuisance for US interests.

The turning point in the relations between the US and the European Community.

The character of the transatlantic relations began to change between the late 1960s and the early 1970s and this had an impact on the relations between the European Community and the US. There were numerous reasons for such a change on both sides of the Atlantic. The American myth suffered a series of serious blows as a consequence of the Vietnam War, as well as of growing internal troubles (from widespread dissent in university and intellectual circles to the violent emerging of the racial issue).[34] anti-Americanism was no longer limited to the Communist Parties or tiny right-wing groups but it became a common feature in the political discourse of opinion leaders, "liberal" politicians, and the "media". Washington's political and economic influence, as well as its "moral" leadership in the West were threatened by some serious failures in US foreign policy, as well as because of the growing difficulties of the American economy.[35] On the other hand, the Nixon administration, especially Henry Kissinger, were perceived as regarding Western Europe as a minor issue as they were focussing on creating an international system based on a strong bipolar relationship with the Soviet Union.

Very early on, Western European leaders became aware of both the development in the US' international role and the European public opinions' changing feelings towards the US. On the other hand in the late 1960s, not least as a consequence of the May 1968 "revolution", western Europe experienced a turn to the left that had a strong and lasting influence, not only on both the image of the United States and the perception about the role of the capitalist system, but also on the character of the integration process.

It is usually stated, as a consequence of the Hague Summit Conference held in December 1969, that the conference marked a further "relaunching of Europe" based on three goals ("enlargement", "achievement",

"deepening"). But the Hague summit conference was not another "relaunching of Europe" but the starting point of a new and different European integration, a real break with the past experience that had been largely influenced by the US, both in a direct and in an indirect way.[36] The "enlargement"—and the coming to power in West Germany of the Social Democrats-meant the death of the "Europe of the Six": that is a mainly conservative, anti-communist, Catholic Europe, and the EEC long-term goal was to become the representative of the whole western Europe. "Achievement" and "deepening" were at the root of a different Economic Community.

First of all the "new" EC was influenced by the belief that the state—or better the embryo of a super state-had to play a major role in the economic system: the launching of new European policies (monetary policy, social policy, regional policy, energy policy, environmental policy, industrial policy, etc.) was the most obvious evidence of such a "state-centred" approach, that, on the other, was the mirror of a growing lack of confidence in the self-regulatory character of the capitalist system, as well as in the hope of unlimited economic growth.[37] In this connection the 1973/1974 economic crisis had a deeper and more lasting impact in Western Europe than in the US. Moreover the EC now tried to develop an autonomous international role. It would be too easy to point out the merely intergovernmental character of the EPC, or the Community's failure to pursue a common foreign policy on several issues. But recent studies have stressed the relevance of the Community's international role, sometimes in opposition to US interests and policies: from the diplomatic initiatives that led to the Helsinki agreements to the attempt at developing different economic and political relations with the so-called "third world", to the attempt at creating a European monetary system, which was the outcome of the European growing lack of confidence in the role played from the late 1960s onwards by the US authorities and by the dollar in the international economic

system.[38] Last but not least, there was some early change in the ideals that were at the basis of the European integration through the re-emerging of a sort of European "third way" or "troisième force", a Social Democrat or Social Christian integration that was mirrored also in the every day political discourse of both its political leaders and officials.

A few US decision-makers perceived such a change in the European Community's attitude: some US politician were deeply suspicious of the EC attempts to develop a monetary policy that would not be subject to the dollar's hegemony, and US officials resented western Europe's lack of cooperation on some thorny international issues (from the crisis in the Middle East to the North-South relationship, etc.),[39] but it is very likely that both Nixon and Kissinger were more irritated rather than worried about the developments in the EC and the widening gap between the US and Western Europe. Kissinger's well-known remark about the EC's phone number perhaps is the best symbol of such an attitude; on the other hand the Nixon administrations, at least till 1973, were convinced that in a bipolar system western Europe was just one of the issues at stake, very likely not the most relevant one. In his "realpolitik" approach Kissinger was not very much interested in confirming the role of the US as a "moral" leader of the West. Last but not least, as far as Europe's position in the confrontation between the superpowers, the Washington authorities were aware that from a strategic viewpoint, the European Community had no role at all, while NATO, that is the US nuclear guarantee of western Europe's security, was still the most important factor in the European military balance.[40]

Nevertheless, especially from the mid-1970s onwards, the crisis in the global "détente", the US' sudden political problems, and the apparent difficulties experienced by the western system in the Southern part of the old continent (Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy) were going to save the partnership between the US and Western Europe. Western European

leaders began to be worried, not only of the growing Soviet influence in the third world or of the collapse of reactionary anti-communist régimes in Southern Europe, but also of both the US political weakness and the appearance of neo-isolationist feelings in the American public opinion, that had been fuelled by the Watergate scandal, the crisis of the political system, the lack of confidence in the American values.

So western European leaders, such as Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, tried to save the Western system and to involve, once again, the US in European affairs. In this connection the European Community was often regarded as a useful instrument. It would be possible to point out the role played by the European Community in favouring the setting up of democratic, pro-western régimes in Southern European countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and in avoiding the involvement of the Communists in the Italian government, as well as the French initiative that was at the origins of the Rambouillet conference and of the creation of the G-7.[41] Such an attitude did not mean the end of the commitment to an autonomous European role-and the creation of the EMS is evidence of such a position-as well as of some contrast with the US, especially in the monetary field.[42] But when the European Monetary System was going to start its activities, the same leaders who had promoted such an initiative were putting pressure on the Carter administration in order to favour a stronger American involvement in western Europe's defence through the deployment of the so-called euromissiles.[43] The emerging of a "new" cold war was going to strengthen once again the bond between the US and Western Europe and once again it was mainly the case of "Empire by invitation", although, at least till the end of the Carter administration, most West European leaders felt that the American "Empire" was definitely weaker and perhaps the Washington administration needed Europe's help in recovering its international role.[44]

Winning the Cold War together.

Very few western European decision decision-makers realised that Margaret Thatcher's coming to power in the UK and Ronald Reagan's electoral victory in the US were going to change radically not only the character of East-West confrontation, but also the features of the relationship between the United States and Western Europe, as well as the future of the European Community.[45] On one hand, as far as the economic dimension was concerned, the EC was confronted with a new challenge posed by the appearance, also owing to the computer revolution, of a stronger, almost unavoidable, tendency towards a global economic system,[46] that was in open contrast with the economic policies pursued by both most EC national governments and the European Community. On the other hand "America was back": not only as the Reagan administration tried to impose once again a powerful military and political leadership on the West, but also as the United States became once again a model, especially as far as technological innovation and popular culture were concerned. West European pundits and opinions makers were often critical of Reaganism while West European statesmen and diplomats were concerned about Reagan's anti-communist crusade. But West European public opinions liked Hollywood movies and soap-operas, and they discovered the fascinating aspects of a new age of affluence after the gloomy and pessimist visions of the 1970s about the future of the western world, as well as of the capitalist system.[47]

On the other hand in the opinion of the US administration, the European Community appeared as a minor actor, that, however, was of some usefulness to Washington's strategic and political goals: as usual the EC favoured stabilisation in Western Europe and it was perceived as a relevant aspect of the West European front in a second "cold war". Obviously there were some contrasts: the US administration disliked the protectionist aspects of the Community, especially the CAP, and there were differences

of opinion about the Middle East, Latin America and the relations with the Third World, but the renewed contrast with the Soviet Union and the common concern about the Kremlin's intention, at least till the mid-1980s, favoured the strengthening of the transatlantic relationship.[48] In the global confrontation with Moscow, the US administration thought that every area of conflict was of some relevance (from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, from the Middle East to Grenada), but, after a long period of détente, Europe was once again at the centre of the "cold war", not only as a consequence of the euromissiles issue or the Polish crisis, but as in the European continent the East-West confrontation had once again a strong ideological character and very quickly it became evident that the "cold war" could be won or lost in the European continent.[49]

Furthermore, at least during the first half of the 1980s, as far as the "cold war" issue was concerned, the US could rely on some important assets; through the deployment of the euromissiles NATO played a new fundamental role in Western strategy.[50] Moreover Washington could rely on the support of the leading West European nations: the US-British "special relationship" was at its height; both Schmidt and Kohl firmly believed in the relevance of the US political and military guarantee to West Germany; Italy rediscovered the importance of the traditional Italian-American tie. Also Mitterrand's France shared Washington's goals on some important issues, such as the nuclear balance in Europe or the maintenance of western influence in Africa.[51]

Nevertheless such a renewed bond between the US and Western Europe was regarded by some European leaders and opinion-makers mainly as a short term process, largely influenced by the concern about Soviet intentions. On a long term perspective there appeared some doubts and fears about a renewed and too powerful American "Empire", which was trying to impose, not only a political and military world leadership,

but also an economic and cultural one. In the late 1960s/early 1970s the integration process had been also the West European response to US moral decline and in the mid-1970s to US political weakness; from the mid-1980s the integration process was the European response to the challenge posed by a new US hegemony. The EC early reaction took place in the economic context: the Community could not oppose what appeared to be a world-wide process towards economic globalisation and, on the basis of a renewed French-German couple, the EC tried to adapt itself to the neo-liberal economic gospel preached by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, through the "White Book", the creation of a larger and freer common market, the launching of the project for a European Monetary Union. It would appear a bit bizarre that the promoters of such a neo-liberal policy were statesmen like Jacques Delors, a Socialist with a Christian background, François Mitterrand, a Socialist President who between 1981 and 1983 had tried to strengthen state intervention in the French economy, and Helmut Kohl, the Catholic chancellor of a country where agreement between government, entrepreneurs and unions was almost a pillar of the West German society.
In this connection John Gillingham's interpretation about Thatcher's "victory" appears less paradoxical than it has been thought, but Gillingham's evaluations seem to forget other important aspects of the new "relaunching of Europe" that took place in the second half of the 1980s. West Europe adapted itself to a new world economic system, but through the integration process, West European leaders tried to defend and to strengthen a European cultural and social identity and to further a European independent role in world affairs.[52] If on one hand the EC complied with neo-liberal policies, on the other it developed further its influence in a growing number of contexts. In this connection it is possible to remember the strengthening of several European policies that had been just sketched out in the 1970s as well as the increasing relevance of EC law. If on one hand the EC favoured a free

market approach, on the other the European Commission tried to launch a social dialogue, that would save the role of the unions and would favour a new, more efficient welfare state.[53] The choice for economic and social cohesion, boosted by the EC enlargement at first to Greece and later on to Spain and Portugal, was based on the "solidarity" concept which appeared a truly European value, based on a mixing up of Socialist traditions and Social Christian ideals. Last but not least the EC tried to create a European identity that could become the pillar of a European citizenship; in this connection we cannot underrate episodes such as the early attempts at creating a European education policy, the attempts at forming a European élite, the struggle in order to launch a European mass culture, the setting up of European symbols, etc.[54] Of course such policies were not anti-American, but, although sometimes in a devious and vague terms, they represented ambitions to create a European actor, perhaps a European third force, in a world that appeared characterised by the growing influence of the American model, by the fading of both the Soviet threat and the Communist alternative and by the world-wide acceptance of a neo-liberal economic system.

The EC strategy appeared to be a successful one as it was favoured by the end of the Cold War: Western Europe was on the winning side and both the US and the European continent seemed to be the actors that were going to benefit from the appearance of a new world order, based on western values. The creation of the European Union with its aspiration to develop a EU foreign and security policy was the proof of such an optimistic mood. Eventually European opinion-makers, politicians and diplomats appeared to underrate that the creation of the EU and its obvious corollary, i.e. Germany's unification, was also the outcome of an American decision: the open support by the Bush administration to Kohl unification policy.[55] In the opinion of the US administration the setting-up of a strong European Union could represent an instrument through which it would be possible to stabilise the whole European continent

in a period of difficult transition. As far as the military aspects were concerned, NATO would guarantee a leading American role in European affairs. At first the Soviet Union accepted a unified Germany as a full member of the Atlantic Pact, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union Washington's main goal was the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance through its enlargement to the former members of the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary the European Union's ambitions at strengthening the Western European Union were largely frustrated by the policies pursued at first by some West European countries, especially the UK and Italy, which were suspicious of too powerful a French-German military cooperation, and later on by the former Communist nations, whose race to the West got a more positive and quick response on the part of the US and the Atlantic Pact, rather than on the part of the European Union.[56]

The misunderstandings of the post-Cold War era

In November 1993 the freshly renamed and revamped European Community—now the European Union was about to begin. One year earlier the US had experienced an important development with the coming back of a Democrat President to the White House. Although the last decade of the twentieth century appeared to be characterised by a positive relationship between the US and the EU, there were already some misunderstandings that would surface later on. As far as the EU was concerned, in spite of some difficulties and disillusionments, the great achievements of the Delors era and an optimist mood could still shape both the choices of EU leaders and the feelings of European public opinions.

The image the Eurocracy gave of the EU was mainly a positive one: the EU was emerging as a powerful international actor, that was already able to play a vital economic role and was aiming at developing a clear cut

foreign policy as well as a definite cultural identity.[57] In Brussels the end of the "cold war", the hopes for a new international order, and the rediscovery of the role the United Nations could play were perceived as positive factors. As far as the US were concerned, if some European scholars and opinion-makers labelled the US as the only superpower and the only nation that could exert a global role, such aspects did not worry European leaders and public opinions too much as the Clinton administration usually enjoyed a positive image in Europe: Clinton was a "liberal" and such a label had a positive impact in Europe, especially after the mid-1990s when the Labour Party came back to power in Britain, the Social Democrats won the German elections and the centre-left ruled Italy. So, for example, in Italy it was possible to speak of a world olive-tree and in Florence the US President met European centre-left leaders and he was greeted by Roberto Benigni, one of media icon of the Italian left.

The US economy experienced a long period of growth and such a trend had some positive influence on the world economy-that is on the EU-too, although some European countries were facing some serious problems. However, the setting up of the EMU was perceived as an important achievement that would enable the EU to strengthen its position in the international economic system. In the field of international affairs the Clinton administration appeared to waver between neo-isolationist feelings, boosted by the end of the "cold war" and idealistic interventionism fuelled by the belief in a new world order and humanitarian intervention. In this connection the Clinton administration appeared to regard the EU as a useful junior partner that could play a leading role in the stabilisation of the old continent, especially as far as some local conflicts were concerned.

Clinton's positive image, however, concealed some important changes in US attitude's towards the European continent. First of all the end of the "cold war" strengthened the US' world role, and Europe was no longer the most important concern in US foreign policy. The end of the Communist

threat involved the end of a link that had played an important part in the transatlantic partnership. The cultural and psychological bonds that had tied the US to Europe were becoming weaker, owing to the change in the ethnic composition of the US population.[58] The generations which, on both shores of the Atlantic, had experienced the second world war and post-war reconstruction were slowly disappearing. Furthermore, although the Clinton administration regarded the EU as a positive factor, the US authorities developed a poor opinion of the EU as a political and military actor mainly as a consequence of the Union's failure to solve a local crisis—the collapse of Yugoslavia—that could mainly be a European concern. In 1995 and in 1999 the EU showed its weakness and Western Europe was compelled to look for Washington's military involvement.[59] On the other hand the Clinton administration pursued the strengthening and the enlargement of NATO to East-Central Europe as an instrument of US influence in an effective way.[60] Moreover, in spite of the end of the "cold war", the Anglo-American "special relationship" survived and Clinton and Blair usually shared common goals. Last but not least, as far as the economic aspects were concerned, US attitudes towards the creation of the Euro was usually characterised by lack of interest or scant confidence in the EU real will to set up a new European currency.

An uncertain past and a difficult future

When we deal with the relations between the US and the EU during the last few years it would be too easy to focus attention on issues such as September Eleven, the war in Iraq, the debate about "old Europe" vs. "young Europe", the belief in a growing gap between a unilateralist, warmongering Anglo-Saxon "West" and a multilateralist, peace-loving continental European "West". Moreover to speak of a period of crisis in the relationship between the US and

the European Union would be a mere truism.[61] Last but not least a historian is not a political scientist, far less a current affairs commentator. So I would limit myself to a few remarks.

First of all once again I would stress that to speak of the EU position would be misleading, the official position of the EU (i.e. the Commission and the Council) in the political field has always been the outcome of diplomatic compromises that lead to vague, moderate statements, usually based on concepts such as the traditional transatlantic friendship and cooperation, etc. Only in the European Parliament harsh criticism of the Bush administration is a common feature. So it would be better to deal with Europe, that is a very vague concept as in a EU composed by 27 countries public opinion attitudes and foreign policies towards the US are a mixing up of different and sometimes contrasting aspects, which, on the other hand, have experienced relevant changes during the last six years.

In spite of those difficulties, it is possible to state that in most EU countries relevant sectors of the public opinion developed a negative image, not only of the Bush administration, but also of the US, while several decision-makers and politicians are critical of the Bush administration foreign policy. As far as the public opinion is concerned, the Bush administration is sometimes perceived as a group of cynical and arrogant right-wing reactionary militarists, largely controlled by capitalist interests, bent on creating a worldwide US empire through aggressive wars. Such an image was strengthened by the fact that also in the US, the Bush presidency is at the centre of a harsh debate and the object of severe criticism. Sometimes the situation is similar to the one experienced during the Viet Nam war and I would stress that the negative feelings about the Bush administration were present in Europe prior to September Eleven as a consequence of the contested election and of Bush image, as he was already perceived as a mediocre leader, to say the least.[62]

On the other hand, especially after September Eleven and the strengthening of the more militant neo-con groups in the Bush administration, bound to unilateral action and variable alliances, the European Union was not regarded as a useful partner, while the Washington administration focussed its attention on creating a group of faithful European allies. Disillusionment, resentment experienced a steady growth on both shores of the Atlantic and, in spite of September Eleven and contrary to the "cold war" period there is no widespread feeling about the presence of a common threat or, better numerous Americans feel that most Europeans are too worried about themselves to recognize the existence of such a threat, while numerous Europeans think that if there is a threat this is partly or just the consequence of America's many faults.[63]

Washington's many blunders and a different interpretation of both the world situation and the way and means to face the terrorist threat led some European leaders to think that the European Union could become a real "third force", a more effective actor in world politics. On the other hand some European opinion-makers have been largely influenced by the belief in a sort of moral and political superiority on the part of the European Union, or better of some European actors. Is there any real ground for such ambitions? Sometimes a vague anti-Americanism appears the only unifying factor in a European Union that during the last few years had been unable to achieve any of the relevant goals Brussels had tried to single out, especially from the political viewpoint. So sometimes the US appears to be the easy scapegoat of EU failures and difficulties.

One century ago Lenin forecast in a well known pamphlet that the capitalist nations would obviously clash among themselves. After the so-called "end of Communism" is Lenin's theory going to be vindicated? Or, at least, is it true that we are facing a growing gap between the US and the European Union as the consequence of fading common values and common interests? Sometimes the Europeans are too inward-looking and

when they look to the US, they still think that the US and Europe are the only important international actors and the transatlantic relationship is the most important relationship. Our cultural, psychological and ideological points of reference are still the ones of the twentieth century, a century largely dominated by Europe and the US. Obviously our every-day political discourse and the presses point out the emergence of new international actors—China, India, Russia, Latin America—but are we so certain that we have understood the implications of such a dramatic change in world balance? In such a wider perspective are our contrasts with the Bush administration so important? Are our cultural and political characters, our way of life, nearer to China's? to India's? Or, in spite of growing difference, are we still nearer to what we can find in the US? What about the feelings of both EU leaders and public opinions towards the US if in two years' time an agreeable, "liberal", multilateralist, Democrat Senator from New York State would win the next presidential elections? The partnership between the US and the EU is a book which is still to be completed.

1 For a wider analysis see G. Bossuat and N. Vaicbourdt (eds), *États-Unis, Europe et Union Européenne. Histoire et avenir d'un partenariat difficile (1945-1999)*, Brussels/Bern, PIE/Peter Lang, 2001 and G. Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. Those volumes offer different interpretations.

2 On the Marshall Plan see in general A. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, London, Methuen 1984 and R. Girault e M. Levy-Leboyer (a cura di), *Le Plan Marshall et le relévement économique de l'Europe*, Paris, comité pour l'Histoire économique et financière de la France, 1993; on the role played by the US see for example M. J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 19476-52*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; D. W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction*, London/New York, Longman, 1992; G. Bossuat, *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine 1945-1952*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1992.

3 On US strategy towards Europe in the early cold war years see for example M. P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford (California), Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 182-265; M. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963*, Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 1999, *passim*; see also C. S. Maier (ed.), *The Cold Wat in Europe Era of a Divided Continent*, New York, Markus Wiener, 1991; D. Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe International Perspectives*, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1994 and "Journal of European Integration History" 2000, vol. 6, No. 2, edited by K. Schwabe.

4 On this aspect see for example R. D'Agata, *La nemesi del prestadenaro. Economia mondiale e guerra fredda, 1944-1948*, Rome, Rubbettino, 2001. On the different ways to deal with the economic crisis of the 1930s see A. L. Hamby, *For the Survival of Democracy. Franklin Roosevelt and the Worls Crisis of the 1930s*, New York, Free Press, 2004.

5 The importance of the cultural factor in the cold war has been stressed in numerous recent studies see, for example W. L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture and Cold War 1945-1961*, London, Macmillan, 1997; F. S. Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper ? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, 1999, D. Caute, *The Dancer Defects. The struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.

6 For an analysis of US foreign policy see for example W. LaFeber, *The American Age US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present*, New York/ London, W. W. Norton, 1994; see also W. R. Meade, *Il serpente e la colomba. Storia della politica estera americana*, Milan, Garzanti, 2002 (this the Italian translation of the volume *Special Providence*).

7 M. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.*, *passim*, see also A. Varsori and E. Calandri (eds), *The Failure of Peace in Europe 1943-48*, London, Palgrave, 2002; S. Dockrill, R. Frank, G.-H. Soutou, A. Varsori (eds), *L'Europe de l'Est et de l'Ouest dans la guerre froide 1948-1953*, Paris, Presses de l'université de Paris Sorbonne, 2003; and D. Reynolds (ed.), *op. cit.*. For an analysis of the development in the attitude of some US leading politicians towards Europe during the first half of the twentieth century see J. L. Harper, *America's Visions of Europe Franklin D. Roosevelt, George E. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992 and D. Fromkin, *In The Time of the Americans*, New York, Vintage Books, 1996.

8 See for example G. Bossuat and A. Wilkens (eds), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la paix*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, *passim*

9 On the roots of the European integration process see for example M. Dumoulin (ed.), *Plans de temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1995; see also S. Pistone (ed.), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1945-1954*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1992, as well as the four volumes edited by W. Lipgens and W. Loth, *Documents on the History of*

European Integration, 4 volls., Berlin/New York, W. De Gruyter, 1985/1991

10 See D. Fromkin, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

11 On this issue see for example P. Craveri and G. Quagliariello (eds), *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2004. See also R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French The Dilemma of Americanization*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, The University of California Press, 1993.

12 See for example some contributions in P. P. D'Attorre (ed.), *Nemici per la pelle. Sogno americano e mito sovietico nell'Italia contemporanea*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1991.

13 On the French case see for example I. Wall, *L'influence américaine sur la politique française 1945-1954*, Paris, Balland, 1989.

14 On the development of US foreign policy during the Eisenhower's administrations see for example: R. H. Immerman (ed.), *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990; S. Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-61*, London, Macmillan, 1996.

15 G. Lundestad, *Empire by Invitation ? The United States and Western Europe 1945-52*, in "Journal of Peace Research", September 1986, p. 263-277.

16 See for example E. Di Nolfo, *Gli Stati Uniti e le origini della Comunità Economica Europea*, in E. Serra (ed.), *The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 1989, p. 339-350; for a different interpretation see P. Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1993, pp. 65-82. On the economic aspects see *Italia, Europa, America. L'integrazione internazionale dell'economia italiana (1943-1963)*, special issue of "Studi Storici", 1996, No. 1.

17 P. Winand, *op. cit.*, p. 83-108.

18 Once again it would be possible to point out Jean Monnet's role; see G. Bossuat and A. Wilkens (eds), *op. cit.*

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Conclusions

Histoire et relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne

Gérard Bossuat*

L'Europe
et la sécurité
du monde

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Histoire
et relations
extérieures
de la
Communauté
européenne

Autant il est normal de s'interroger sur les affaires intérieures de l'Union, autant il est plus difficile de poser la question des relations extérieures de l'Union. Il apparaît que les relations extérieures de la Communauté sont strictement délimitées par le traité de Communauté économique européenne de 1957 aux affaires commerciales et à une représentation dans les organisations économiques mondiales. L'échec cuisant de la CED en 1954 a ruiné pour longtemps l'idée d'une communauté politique et donc d'une politique étrangère commune. Les vigoureuses réactions des partenaires de la France aux propositions du général de Gaulle de construire une Union politique ont repoussé l'invention d'une politique étrangère commune à Six : « Three points were crucial, écrit un auteur, the Europeans were divided about their relations with the US, about Britain's role in Europe, and about the structure of a united Europe. In all three issues, there was a major dividing line between France and the Five. » La perception des relations extérieures de la Communauté et de l'Union a totalement changé à partir de la crise du SMI (1969-1978) et par la fin de la guerre froide en 1989. Dès lors, les acteurs communautaires ont légitimé les relations extérieures de la Communauté allant même jusqu'à imaginer une politique étrangère commune.

Deux textes nous aideront à bien poser le problème. Le premier vient de la Commission européenne en 1968 : « L'Europe a de grandes responsabilités dans le monde. L'Europe des Six, inférieure aux États-Unis en puissance militaire, industrielle et financière, est déjà leur égale dans le domaine du commerce….Aujourd'hui déjà dans sa dimension actuelle, demain davantage quand elle sera réunie, elle a des devoirs essentiels à remplir à l'égard des pays en voie de développement… Au surplus, au moment où l'organisation du monde à l'échelle des vieilles nations souveraines fait place à celle de l'organisation à l'échelle des continents, il est essentiel de ne pas répéter à ce niveau plus élevé les erreurs du passé, de ne pas substituer

aux chocs des nations celui de continents entiers et, dès lors, l'Europe a le devoir essentiel d'organiser sa coopération et son association avec les autres grands ensembles du monde ».

Le second date de 2003 et provient du Conseil de l'Union : « The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world. »

On aura noté l'ampleur et le souffle de la description du destin européen et surtout l'évolution qui s'est produite entre 1968 et 2006. L'Europe peut prendre plus de responsabilités mondiales. L'explication de cette évolution de l'Union européenne a plusieurs origines que l'historien souligne à sa manière :

— **1. Les convictions** des hommes de la Communauté ont compté. Si la Commission avait été seulement un organe de technocrates, on en serait resté à la lettre du traité. Or de grands présidents de la Commission, de grands commissaires européens ou de grands directeurs généraux, Hallstein, Marjolin, Rey, Deniau, Wellenstein, ont voulu donner un espace mondial à l'action de la Communauté. Sans doute étaient-ils convaincus du bien fondamental que la Communauté représentait pour les Européens et pour les relations internationales. Sans doute aussi la jeune Commission économique était-elle décidée à poursuivre l'intégration dans l'ordre politique. Les opinions publiques européennes ont plaidé aussi en faveur d'une politique étrangère commune devant les graves crises politiques et militaires, séquelles de la guerre froide dans les Balkans.

— **2. L'intérêt communautaire** pour le monde vient aussi de la réussite de la politique commerciale européenne au Gatt, vis-à-vis des pays industrialisés, qui a renforcé la libération des échanges tout en construisant l'intégration

européenne sur des politiques communes. La Communauté a aussi tenté d'améliorer les revenus des pays ACP sans pouvoir inventer un ordre nouveau économique que Raoul Prebisch appelait de ses vœux à la Cnuced puisqu'une faible partie des exportations ACP en a réellement profité. La crédibilité internationale de la Communauté européenne a grandi du fait de ses relations avec le monde communiste. Poussée sans doute par les intérêts commerciaux et économiques des pays membres, elle a réussi à créer des liens commerciaux avec chacun des pays du Caem pour affaiblir l'ensemble, sans diaboliser l'empire soviétique. Cette politique de pacification commerciale exprimait bien l'état d'esprit général en Europe envers le bloc de l'Est comme avec ses voisins méditerranéens. Cette crédibilité extérieure a encore grandi quand la Communauté a participé à la négociation des accords d'Helsinki en août 1975 intervenant très largement sur la liberté des échanges et sur les droits de l'Homme. Une diplomatie communautaire se développa. La Communauté européenne «as far back as 1975, the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act, with its focus upon human rights and state obligations, was already becoming in some respects the leader in turning European international politics to a new kind of thinking».

— **3. Le monde a rejoint la Communauté** au moment de la crise monétaire du SMI. La création d'un espace monétaire stable en Europe (serpent puis SME) indiquait clairement où était la sagesse en dépit de l'Administration américaine du Trésor qui voulait la flexibilité au sein du SMI et non le resserrement des marges. Aussi la négociation d'une UEM, commencée avec le plan Werner de 1970, fut reçue par les États-Unis comme un acte d'autonomie des Communautés. La route de la monnaie unique n'était pas pour autant ouverte aux Européens très partagés sur le remède à appliquer : soit la convergence économique préalable, soit la création d'un espace monétaire a priori. L'euro confère-t-il à l'Union un rôle dans les affaires internationales ? La réponse semblait évidente au moment de son lancement, il deviendrait

une monnaie de réserve. Or ce n'est pas encore le cas en 2007, ni en Chine, ni au Proche-Orient. Mais personne ne peut nier le rôle stabilisateur de l'euro dans les échanges monétaires.

— **4. Des crises politiques et militaires ou humanitaires** ont évidemment impliqué l'Union qui a dû répondre aux menaces qui pesaient sur elle et ses amis. À partir du traité de Maastricht une PESC et une PESD sont devenues possibles. Mais comment l'Union peut-elle peser dans les affaires du monde sans savoir si elle doit assurer seule ou avec l'Otan sa sécurité ? Comment agir sans un véritable centre d'impulsion de politique étrangère, alors que vingt-sept États aux intérêts totalement contradictoires tentent de préserver leur souveraineté et que les petits pays comme les grands pèsent d'un poids identique au Conseil sans avoir les mêmes charges budgétaires ? Des formes de coopération européenne dans le domaine de la défense existent autour des grands pays de l'Union, mais les doctrines d'emploi des forces ne peuvent se résumer aux accords de Petersberg de 1992. Le gouffre technologique entre l'Union et les États-Unis pour la conception d'armements nouveaux résulte de l'émiettement de la prise de décision entre les États de l'Union et l'Otan. Jusqu'à ce jour il a paru illusoire que l'Union puisse compter dans les relations internationales du fait de son rôle militaire.

— **5. L'Union compte-t-elle** dans les affaires du monde du fait de son identité politique, sociale et culturelle ? La question d'un modèle identitaire européen original et reproductible se pose parce que ce modèle communautaire a réussi, depuis 1950, à maintenir la paix et à produire de la richesse et des valeurs dans les pays membres. En termes de valeurs immatérielles, spirituelles et culturelles, personne ne nie les progrès accomplis dans la tolérance et la résorption des vieilles querelles immémoriales. La Communauté a ainsi aidé les populations européennes à atteindre un haut degré de civilisation en s'acceptant différentes. Moins de violence, plus de négociations caractérisent l'identité européenne

actuelle. Ce modèle peut faire envie à des pays en proie aux dissidences et aux tensions armées et à ceux qui cherchent le moyen d'atteindre un grand développement économique.

L'identité culturelle européenne est un dossier sensible en raison des menaces réelles ou fantasmatiques qui pèsent sur la pérennité des cultures européennes du fait de la très forte influence américaine ou de la mondialisation des médias. La directive « télévision sans frontières » de 1989, révisée en 1997, ne laisse pas le marché décider seul de la circulation des services audiovisuels en Europe. Des articles du projet de Constitution européenne sont dédiés au respect des différences culturelles. La culture s'est progressivement imposée dans la politique communautaire pour renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance des citoyens à l'Union. Ces dispositions ont encouragé certains pays d'Amérique latine à suivre cette voie. L'identité culturelle communautaire est donc très éloignée du culte des valeurs communautaristes ou du monolinguisme. Elle est universaliste.

La solidarité institutionnalisée, enfin, est la marque de l'Europe communautaire. La solidarité est solennellement réaffirmée dans le projet de Constitution (articles 87 à 96) à laquelle s'ajoutent des objectifs de plein-emploi et de lutte contre la pauvreté. Les premiers législateurs des Communautés ont inventé les fonds structurels permettant d'accélérer le développement des régions pauvres de l'Union. La libre circulation des travailleurs et la coordination des régimes de sécurité sociale ont été établies ; l'égalité des salaires entre les hommes et des femmes a été reconnue. Le droit du travail assure la protection des salariés. Même si l'État-providence semble en recul en Europe, la régulation des rapports sociaux par la négociation, la lutte contre les discriminations, le rôle de la puissance publique restent au cœur de l'identité européenne. Un politologue écrit que les États de l'Union « sont animés par un mobile commun : l'Europe doit devenir pour les générations futures un espace de paix, de stabilité et de prospérité. La sécurité doit y

régner et, avec elle, le respect du droit et de la personne de chaque citoyen. La guerre cesse d'y être un instrument légitime ». L'Europe a un projet de société, un projet identitaire, qui peut lui donner un certain poids dans les affaires du monde et dans les enceintes internationales. L'Union, puissance civile pourrait devenir une puissance normative.

Est-il souhaitable pour l'Europe et le monde que l'Union européenne soit une « soft power », Vénus pour Kagan ? En raison de son histoire violente et impérialiste, l'Europe ne peut plus être une puissance unilatérale. L'unilatéralisme dans les relations internationales est le propre des États-Unis depuis le 11 septembre 2001. Pourtant, la gestion raisonnée des crises internationales par le multilatéralisme est une nécessité qui aboutit à une situation de « gagnant-gagnant » d'après de nombreux observateurs. Sans doute le document de l'Union intitulé « une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur », adopté en décembre 2003 par le Conseil européen de Bruxelles, décrit-il parfaitement les enjeux de la politique étrangère de l'Union.

L'Europe doit-elle se priver de redevenir un centre de décision politique mondiale ? Est-elle à la dérive et impotente ? Si les États-Unis ont assumé un leadership que l'Europe leur a abandonné, l'Union européenne manifeste aussi son intention de prendre sa part de responsabilités dans les relations internationales, comme le montrent ses différents engagements ou ses politiques de lutte contre l'inégal développement et contre la destruction de l'environnement. Or la multipolarité est ridiculisée par des intellectuels conservateurs américains qui affirment : « Europeans must shed their illusions about what they can accomplish in the world on their own. » Les Européens sont invités à suivre la politique américaine. Pourtant les opinions publiques européennes croient au leadership européen dans les affaires internationales depuis 2002, mais les Européens sont divisés sur les moyens d'y parvenir puisque 46 % estiment que l'Union européenne doit augmenter sa puissance

militaire et que 51 % ne sont pas d'accord. Une majorité voudrait cependant un ministre européen des Affaires étrangères. Si une majorité d'entre eux pensent que l'élargissement est un facteur d'accroissement de la puissance européenne, l'histoire récente invite à se demander si au contraire certains élargissements ne sont pas des facteurs d'incohérence et réducteurs de puissance.

Les peuples européens vont-ils accepter ce que leur propose l'actuelle Commission européenne : la puissance économique, la compétitivité, la dérégulation et le développement de l'éducation, de la recherche et de l'innovation, comme le déclare Benita Ferrero-Waldner, commissaire aux relations extérieures ? Si l'Union veut agir comme une « puissance globale dans la gouvernance économique, sociale et environnementale du monde », elle doit parler d'une seule voix, face à des États-Unis hyperpuissants, premiers partenaires économiques et premiers alliés de l'Union européenne.

Un nouveau dessein pour l'Union a été proposé : celui de « la puissance tranquille », fondée sur les principes des Lumières et sur l'autonomie de la défense européenne. Il a l'avantage de se référer à des concepts issus d'une période riche de l'histoire de l'Europe tout en admettant le recours à la force militaire en cas de besoin. Il n'est donc plus temps de se demander si « le statut d'acteur de la sécurité implique que toutes les dimensions (normative, civile et militaire) soient présentes », mais il est temps que l'Europe les rende compatibles, « en promouvant, par exemple, une approche différente de la notion de puissance ». S'il est possible d'imaginer un nouveau destin pour l'Europe c'est que depuis 1957 le processus communautaire a récréé les conditions de l'influence de l'Europe dans le monde. Les conditions institutionnelles, cependant, ne sont pas encore réunies pour mener une politique étrangère digne des pionniers de l'intégration européenne.

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L'Union européenne peut-elle, et doit-elle, disposer d'une force militaire propre ? Est-elle un acteur autonome dans les relations internationales ? Quels sont les outils dont elle dispose pour développer sa politique extérieure dans les domaines de l'économie, de la diplomatie et de la sécurité ?

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Le rôle de l'Union doit évoluer dans un monde en mouvement. Les contributeurs montrent qu'en dépit de grands progrès de l'esprit communautaire, les ambiguïtés subsistent, qui empêchent l'Union et les États membres de répondre aux défis actuels des relations internationales.

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